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Abstract
Empirical evidence, especially in case studies, shows that individual le ders often have a crucial role
in successful enterprise transformation in transition economies. Conventional economic analysis
alone cannot explain this role of leadership. In this paper we use coordination games to  analyse
transitions from one Nash-equilibrium to another. We argue that the creation of common
knowledge among stakeholders by a leader allows firms to overcome coordination failures. This
is crucial for enterprise transformation because of the multiplicity of stakeholders who need to
coordinate their action to implement radical organizational change.
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Introduction
Widespread malaise characterizes the progress of enterprise transformation (ET) in Eastern Europe
(e.g. Nellis 1999). At the same time, scholars express a sense of dissatisfaction with agency-based
corporate governance analysis as the main avenue for analysing ET (Stiglitz 1999, Kogut and
Zander 2000, Spicer, McDermott and Kogut 2000). Notably, few performance differences can be
explained by the differences in ownership and governce structure, especially in the former Soviet
Union (Estrin and Wright 1999). 
Case evidence points to an aspect scarcely considered in the literature: the role of
individuals at the helm of the enterprise. This pap r presents a theoretical logic that can explain the
progress in ET, independent of the principal-agent logic of corporate governance that has
dominated the transition literature so far. Successful ET requires to solve a major coordination
game. Yet coordination games frequently fail, even in simple experimental settings (Ochs 1995).
A mechanism is thus needed that induces agents to choose routines that provide the mutually best
outcome. Leaders can resolve c ordination games not only by changing the structure of the game
but by creating common knowledge among players on which routines shall be p rsued in the future.
They can therefore overcome the extensive coordination problems faced by firms during ET.
The next section introduces the coordination problems of economic transition, which are
analysed in a game-theoretic perspective in section three. Section four concludes with the
implications for policy and further research.
Enterprise Transformation as a Coordination Problem
ET requires a radical change of the enterpris  (Newmann and Nollen 1998, Meyer 1998) changing
not only the production process but also the nature of its external relations and thus its ‘inner
logic’. Enterprises are complex social organizations that bring together a large number of
individuals with very diverse and potentially conflicting interests. This holds especially true in
enterprises undergoing the transformation from plan to market as not only internal but also many
external stakeholders aim to influence its restructuring strategy (Berglöf and v.Thadden 1999,
Mygind 1999). The success or failure of ET depends on the combined effort of inter alia,
 employees, who are a very heterogeneous group, and may have ownership rights too, 
 shareholders (after privatization), who may be dispersed, or l nk d to the firm in ways other
than ownership,
Formal models on markets in transition are also pres nted by Aghion and Schankerman (1999), who1
analyze how investment in infrastructure development can, by reducing transaction costs, intensify
competition and thereby induce industrial restructuring, and by Atkeson and Kehoe (1996) who
model labour market frictions.
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 providers of non-equity capital,
 providers of  technological and managerial knowledge, 
 suppliers and customers, some related by a long-term cooperation,
 government bureaucrats and politicians, whose support is necessary not only in firms in
state-ownership, but also for private firms with a restructuring plan that depends on the
regulatory environment, or direct or indirect financial support.
Case research on privatization and restructuring provides plenty of evidence of ET being derailed
by conflicts between multiple agents. In Hungary, Antal-Mokos (1998) observed that internal
’politicking’ between different groups and the involvement of political interest groups has
prevented the implementation of a coherent strategy. In Poland, the need to obtain support from
employees and their elected worker council has inhibited many restructuring plans (Carlin et al.
1995, Brada and Singh 1999, Bak and Kolawcuk 1998). In the Baltic states and Russia, insider-
ownership necessitates building broad support within the organization for major strategic decisions.
Throughout the region, conflicts between multiple stakeholders, or with individuals holding
restitution claims, delayed substantive investment in restructuring.
Scholars have recognized coordination problems as a major cause of market failure during
transition. Swaan (1997) argues that several types of transaction costs are involved in establishing
new relationships because agents have few contacts and reference points for future business.
Agents not only have to engage in search and negotiations, but they have to develop new
competences required for market-based transactions. Thi  transaction problem has been formalized
by Blanchard and Kremer (1997) who show that the output drop in transition economies can be
largely explained by coordination failure, which they model based on information asymmetries.
Roland and Verdier (1999) present a similar model based on the search costs of finding business
partners. However, scholars have to date not addressed coordination failures wi hi enterprises.1
The complex bargaining situations with multiple diverse agents related to any firm are hard
to analyse with principal-agent theory, because agency relationships are poorly defined, or non-
existing. The policy advice of principal agency theorists thus focusses on the creation of clear
Moreover, the concept of Nash-equilibrium may be unsuitable to identify an optimal strategy for a2
firm because it is by definition stable under the condition of non-cooperative behaviour. However,
most firms would be far better off if they can achieve cooperative behaviour. This requires a
mechanism that encourages cooperation, which our approach provides.
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governance structures that define agency relationships. Yet this is easier said then done.
Formalizing the ngotiation setting is complex and, while a Nash-equilibrium may exist, finding it
may take far longer than the pressures of competitive markets permit.2
Case evidence shows, however, that some firms hav been successful over the past decade.
We have collected in-depth case studies on ET and identified those positive outliers that according
to the respective authors, excel in terms of performance (table 1). These firms developed a pro-
active strategy pursuing a niche market strategy and/or acquiring complementary assets
internationally. As would be expected, they have some valuable technological assets and a workable
governance structure with hard budget constraints. 
*****
insert table 1 approximately here
*****
Yet in addition, the authors in most cases of outstanding performance emphasize the role
and personality of the individual, or the management team, leading the enterprise. Like Krystof
Piotrowski of Szczecin Shipyard (Johnson and Loveman 1996), they are not just executives, but
Schumpeterian managers, or, in other words, leaders. They have managed the formidable
challenges to create and implement new corporate strategies. 
The importance of bringing in new managers, rather than creating stronger incentives for
incumbents is also highlighted in empirical studies. Barberis et al. (1996), who analyse 452 shops
in Russia, find that change of the manager stimulates restructuring. Hence they argue that
“restructuring requires new people, who have new skills more suitable to a market economy”, and
that “equity incentives for old people might not be particularly effective in bringing about significant
change” (1996:488). Also, Claessens and Djankov (1998) find that performance in the Czech
Republic is improved by changing managers, but no by providing managers with incentives in form
of equity stakes. All their performance indicators are negatively correl ed with the length of tenure
of the general manager of the firm, but positively correlated to the external recruitment of
Moreover, Dyck (1997) presents a theoretical model that presumes that a change of managers is a3
key objective for privatization. 
We adapt the following terminology: strategy refers to the action of the firm, and routi e to the4
actions by individuals within the firm.
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managers.  Djankov (1999) finds that general management training, independent of its functional3
specialization, has a substantive positive effect on firm performance.
What distinguishes a leader from an administrative head of a business unit, as many of them
were before 1989? First, they have to de lop a corporate strategy. They have to identify business
opportunities through continuous analysis of the business environment and of the position of the
firm and its resources. On this basis, strategies have to b  developed, assessed, and adjusted, which
requires both analytical skills and creativity. The strategy may be expressed in a business plan that
shows how the firm shall be repositioned. It establishes how the resources of the firm shall be
combined and organized in innovative ways to create a competitive edge in whatever markets the
firm chooses to be in. Among the infinite number of possibl  restructuring strategies, the leader has
to identify one path that the enterprise shall pursue.
Secondly, the strategy has to be implemented. This requires coordination of the activity of
all the stakeholders that provide resources for the operations of the firm. They, or at least a critical
mass of them, have to be convinced of the path to pursue. An important step in doing so is to
create appropriate incentive structures for the individual agents. Notably, those who would loose
out, may have to be compensated by side payments. If the incentives faced by individual agents are
not compatible, e.g. due to prisoners’ dilemma type problems, non-cooperative games can emerge.
To resolve such incentive conflicts, (Dewatripont and Roland (1995) propose sequential coalition
building. This has been essential at several stages of the Russian reform process as stakeholders
have been expropriated or co-opted (Shleifer and Treisman 1999).
Yet, even if all stakeholders would become better off with the new strat gy, they may fail
to coordinate their individual routines accordingly. They may face cognitive barriers to4
understanding the structure of the game and other players’ likely actions. Leadership can overcome
the coordination failure and bring all members of an organization on a common path of change -
by creating the expectation that everyone else is pursuing the same path (Foss 2000). We analyse
a ‘coordination game’ to demonstrate this role of leadership. Coordination games may appear
simplistic relative to non-cooperative games, yet they provide a powerful tool to analyse
For a recent review of coordination games, formal models and macroeconomic applications see5
Cooper (1999).
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organizational realities, and the emergence or design of institutions in par ic lar (Camerer and Knez
1994, Cavert 1995). To focus the argument, we thus assume henceforth that incentive-5
compatibility problems have been resolved.
A Coordination Game Analysis
Transition can be depict d as moving socialist firms from a low-level equilibrium to a higher level
one. It should, in theory, be obvious to all agents involved that they can achieve higher returns for
their firms and for themselves personally, if they change their individual routines to market-based
ones. Yet why are they not changing?
Figure 1 illustrates the dilemma of agents in a firm undergoing deep restructuring as a
‘coordination game’ (cf. Farrell 1988, Colman 1997). Two players, 1 and 2 both face a choice
betwen two routines A and B. The pay-off matrix appears to suggest, at first sight, that both
players ought to play strategy B, and collect the pay-off of two units each. 
Figure 1: A coordination game
Player 2
A B
Player 1 A  (1,1)  (0,0) 
B  (0,0)  (2,2) 
Note: in the initial situation, all agents play routine A (shaded area).
Yet, suppose the two players have played routine A for the past forty years, currentl
earning pay-offs of (1,1). They may become aware that due to changes in the environment, routine
B becomes feasible, but they individually have incentives to stay with strategy A, if expectations
over other player’s strategy are formed based on past behaviour. No one has incentives to divert
from (A,A), which is a Nash-equilibrium. Such a backw rd formation of expectations is commonly
assumed in adaptive learning and evolutionary models of game theory (e.g. Fudenberg and Kreps
1993), and fairly realistic unless potential losses are small. Experiments of repeated games have
There has not been any systematic experimental research on how shocks that change the pay-off6
influence the likelihood of observing convergence to an equilibrium, let alone a specific equilibrium
(Ochs 1995). The outcome is likely to be highly sensitive to how the information on the changes
reaches the players.
Dependent on the structure of the game, it may suffice that agents share common beliefs rather than7
common knowledge (Monderer and Samet 1989). Agents’ successful coordination of routines
depends on the beliefs they hold about each others beliefs. The more well-founded these beliefs are,
the better they are able to coordinate (Foss 2000).
On the other hand, in certain situations, even almost common knowledge may not suffice to
coordinate on the most efficient outcome: Suppose coordination occurs vi  e-mail, yet a message gets
lost. As agents do not know whose message got lost, they may fail to coordinate on the most
preferable outcome (Rubinstein 1989). 
Analogous to convention in the principal agent literature, we refer to the leader as she, and to the8
players (agents, employees, stakeholders) as he. 
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shown strong path dependency: “learning commonly yields convergence to an equilibrium in the
stage game, but the outcome is frequently history-dependent, and the effects of strategic
uncertainty may persist long after it has been eliminated by learning” (Crawford 1997: 235,
emphasis added).
A move to the higher level equi ibrium will occur if both players believe that the other will
play the new routines. The switch to the higher level-equilibrium requires players to change their
beliefs about the other player. R cognizing the new strategic option, players do not know if the6
other player has the same information. Neither do they know when the other player will move to
routine B. The agents will only act if they share ‘common knowledge’ (Lewis 1969, Geanakoplos
1992) on the structure of the new game, and when the switch to the new routines is to occur.
Common knowledge refers to a situation where A knows that B knows that A knows that B
knows, and so on, i.e. all agents know that others also share the knowledge, inclusive the fact that
everyone else knows it too. Without common knowledge, on both the new pay-off structure and
the timing of the switch, the higher-level Nash-equilibrium may never be reached.7
Let us take the timing issue first. In our simple example, the coordination can be achieved
through modifications in the assumptions, e.g. by allowing pre-play communication (Farrell 1988,
Myerson 1989, Kim and Sobel 1995). Suppose, one player is appointed leader allowing her to8
make (non-committing) announcements about the strategy. This suffices for her to lead the game
to a Pareto-optimal Nash-equilibrium if she announces a strategy, from which she has no incentives
to divert. Communicating it, she creates a focal point hat becomes common knowledge.
The situation is more complex if both players are permitted to send messages to each other before9
the game. If played infinitely, they too reach the superior Nash equilibrium eventually (Kim and
Sobel 1995). Yet, as shown in the experiments by Cooper et al. (1994), coordination failure in the
initial stages of the game is likely. 
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Experimental studies show that one-sided announcements increase the likelihood of reaching the
efficient outcome substantially (Cooper et al. 1994).9
Moreover, a leader can overcome coordination failure by creating common knowledge
about the strategy to be pursued (Foss 2000). She takes the necessary decisions on corporate
strategy and the future role of the agents. Since the strategy is new - strategy formulation is a
creative act - we cannot assume, as most game-theoretic analysis does, that the structure of the new
game is common knowledge. Two-person two-routine games are very simplifying approximations
of the real world, where games are large, with imperfect recall, state-contingent uncertainty etc.
Agents are likely to have incomplete information (or, especially in a transition context, none at all)
about other players and available strategies (Calvert 1995, Foss 2000). In other words, the common
knowledge about the game has to be created. Strategic decisions have to be communicated to all
stakeholders in such ways that everyone knows that this knowledge is hared with all other relevant
parties. 
Thus the leader can facilitate the move to a higher level equilibrium by coordinating the
complementary actions of agents through designing incentive compatible routines and by creating
a common knowledge concerning their implementation. The techniques employed by leaders t
create common knowledge may be culturally bound. Western business leaders and scholars stress
the need to create a tangible vision to focus the organisation’s activities and learning (e.g. Ireland
and Hitt 1999, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). A shared vision impliescommon knowledge on the
organisation’s objectives. It may be created through, for example, public speeches to communicate
in person and simultaneously to many agents, who thus know that they share the new knowledge
with everyone else who also attended the event. Increasingly, video-conferencing and e-mailing to
‘everyone in group x’ provide alternative, though imperfect, means.
Participatory decision processes that involve public debate on the underlying issues facilitate
the creation of common knowledge on challenges f cing the organization, and alternative strategic
responses (though not the decision itself). In Russia, Vlachoutsicos (1998) observed a traditional
participatory process, which ends with a decision that is taken at the top and communicated ‘top-
down’. This process, even if ritualized and with little impact on the actual decision in socialist and
This situation is similar to ‘stag hunt games’ where routines are associated with different efforts and10
returns depend on the lowest effort by any player. Experiments have shown that, although groups
often reach an equilibrium, failure to coordinate on the Pareto-optimal equilibrium was observed in
several of the experiments reviewed by Crawford (1997) and Ochs (1995).
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post-socialist firms, provides an important means to share knowledge. Moreover, it informs the
leader where she has to fill in gaps of the common knowledge of the organization.
Figure 1 depicts the simplest form of a coordination game. Yet, the real world is more
complex, even without conflicting interests. Complexity, however, reinforces the inertia, i.e. the
stability of the inferior Nash-equilibrium. Let us consider some relat d challenges facing enterprises
during transformation using coordination games as framework. Small variations can m ke the game
a more appropriate reflection of the situation of firms facing ET:
• Suppose, a sunk cost is required to change the routines, which may moreover be higher the
earlier a player changes his routine.
• Suppose, stakeholders face several new strategies B, C, D, ... that yield higher returns only
if all pursue the same routine, but lower returns otherwise. The game has multiple Pareto-
ranked equilibria, but no selection mechanism to choose among them,or10
• Suppose, the new routines require considerable learning in the organization, as is common
in the case of ET (e.g. Child and Czegledy 1996). All agents have to be educated h w to
implement their new routines. This may involve fundamental changes, e.g. in
communication patterns or in attitudes towards quality and efficiency. Agents aiming for
a new routine B may thus erroneously play routine B*, which results in an inferior
outcome. Figure 2 illustrates such a situation, making the positive assumption that one
player’s failure does not affect the other player’s pay-off. Even so, it makes a change of
routines more risky, and thus reinforces inertia.
Under less favourable assumptions, the coordination challenge becomes even more
complex: If the higher level pay-off is dependent on both players playing B correctly, then
the choice of action depends additionally on each players’ be ief of the other player
knowing how to play B. In addition to training, effective communication between the
participants about their capabilities, facilitated by the leader, is essential to solving this
coordination game.
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Figure 2: Coordination game with a faulty strategy
Player 2
A B B*
Player 1 A  (1,1)  (0,0)  (0,0) 
B  (0,0)  (2,2)  (2,0) 
B*  (0,0)  (0,2)  (0,0) 
Note: in the initial situation, all agents play routine A (shaded area).
Furthermore, ET requires the coordination of a large number of stakeholders. Theoretical and
empirical research suggests that wi  the number of players, the probabilty of coordination failure
increases. This is caused by the fact that in most of the games analyzed, defection of a single agent
significantly reduces returns for all others. Theoretical models show such failure for instance if
mutations or inertia influence the selection of routines (Cooper 1999:14). Experimental research
mostly uses ’weakest-link games’, and find that groups of 10 persons or more mostly fail to
coordinate on the optimal equilibrium (e.g. Camerer and Knez 1994). 
However, such strict necessity of all agents co-operating is not an appropriate reflection
of ET, which is the focus of this analysis. It is more fitting to assume that superior outcome is
reached if many but not necessarily all agents cooperate. Figure 3 considers a game where many
players need to coordinate their shift from an established but inferior routine <old’ to a superior one
called <new’. The new routine yields a higher pay-off if, and only if, a substantial proportion of the
agents hift to the new regime. If only a small number of agents change, everyone may in fact
become worse off. This leads to a critical mass problem: it is necessary that a sufficiently larg
number of agents believe that a critical number of others will shift to the new routine. This is
illustrated in the dynamic coordination game with ten agents in Figure 3:
In real life situations, such a transitional crises may undermine the credibility of the leader, or of the11
announced strategy. If the structure of the game and its payoffs is not common knowledge, this can
thus lead to a resistence to change, and in fact attempts to return to the original equilibrium, even
though under the above assumptions the game would converge to the superior Nash equilibrium. 
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Figure 3: Coordination Game with a Critical Mass
Payoff for players playing <old’ and <new’,respectively.
number of agents playing ‘new’
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
old routine 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 n.a.
new routine n.a. 0 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 5 6
Note: Individual payoff for players playing old / new routine, dependent on the number of players
that switch to the new routine. Initially, all agents play the old routine (shaded area).
In the initial situation, all ten players follow the old routine and collect a payoff of 3, as illustrated
by the shaded area. If some agents change to the new routine, this will reduce e benefits for those
staying with the old routine. If all ten switch to the new routine, they will all be better off.
However, the initial position is a stable Nash-equilibrium: with adaptive expectations (based on
other agents’ past behaviour), no agent, not even a pair of agents, has an incentive to change. It
requires a coordination of - in the example - at least six agents to play ‘new’ to create a situation
where playing ‘new’ yields at least equal return of 3 units. 
Considering the evolutionary dynamics of the game, it has three equilibria, of which two
are stable. In repeated rounds of this game, with expectations formed based on past outcomes, the
dynamics of the game will lead to a convergence to an equilibrium where all agents play the same
strategy, ‘old’ or ‘new’, though it may temporarily rest at the inferior unstable equilibrium where
four player pursue the new strategy. If at least five agents shift to ‘new’ (e.g. because they trust
their leader), then the game will converge to the new equilibrium where all play ‘new’. Notice,
however, that during the adjustment, the return here falls from 3 units to 2 units before increasing
to 6 units, a transitional crises as observed in many firms during radical change.11
If less than four agents shift to the new regime, the dynamics of a repeated game will lead
to a return to the original, low-level equilibrium. The leader thus does not need to convince all
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stakeholders to adopt the new routine, but only a critical mass of agents. This critical mass is ‘five
out of ten’ in the example, but may be anywhere from 0.1% to 100% of the workforce in real life,
and some agents may carry more weight than others.
The critical mass game, however, requires less strict assumptions about agents sharing
common knowledge on the structure of the game. It suffices that a critical mass of agents believes
that a critical mass understands the game, and will thus switch. With evolutionary dynamics like
those depicted in Figure 3, large groups are easier to coordinate. The leader thus to create common
beliefs among a large number of her employees, but does not need to fulfil the strict assumptions
associated with the theoretical concept of common knowledge. 
Conclusion and Extensions
ET in transition economies requires radical changes not only at the organizational level, but for
each individual related to it. To induce an agent to change his behaviour, he not only needs to
learn the new routines, but he has to form the belief that other agents will also change their
routines in such way that his new routine will make him better off. We have argued that this kind
of coordination problem can be overcome by a leader of the organization, who performs the
following tasks:
• to define the strategy of the firm out of a subset of alternative transformation strategies.
• to create incentives that minimize conflicts of interest among the stakeholders, i.e. the new
corporate strategy becomes a Nash equilibrium of individual routines.
• to create common knowledge about the new strategy among a critical mass of agents who
will thus switch and initiate evolutionary dynamics which in turn will lead to a superior
Nash-equilibrium.
This leadership challenge emerges not only in enterprise transformation. Similar dynamic
coordination games emerge at several levels in transition economies (Shleifer and Treisman 1999).
For instance, firms are integrated into business networks, especially if there is limited entry. They
will move from the old-boy survival and rent-seeking type of networks (Huber and Worgötter
1998) to entrepreneurial networks when a critical mass of fir s finds it more beneficial to leave
the old networks. Also the protectionism of regions within Russia suffers from a dynamic
coordination game default as individual regions try to protect their local industry through trade
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bariers (Broadman 1999). Most would benefit from trade liberalization, but - as in international
trade - strong lobbying by local firms inhibits the l beralization. At every level, a critical mass of
agents changing to the new set of routines, attitudes and business strategies is necessary to move
the group as a whole to a new, better world. A leader can play a pivotal role in moving society
from one stable equilibrium to another one, usually a superior one.
Further research should incorporate this crucial role of leaders. In particular, empirical
studies on enterprises in transition should include vectors of personal characteristics of leadership,
such as the prior experience and reputation of both the CEO and the top management team. The
empirical research by Barberis et al. (1996) has pointed to the importance of managers as leaders
of firms in transition, yet this needs to be taken further. Theoretical research should deepen the
analysis of coordination problems in transformation processes, analysing for instance under which
circumstances agents behave cooperatively and/or follow the direction proposed by a leader.
Moreover, how can one create selection mechanisms that bring individuals with coordination skills
into leadership positions, and how can incentives be designed for top managers to act as leaders,
and in the best interest of the organization?
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Table 1: Outlier Analysis: 
Cases of former state firms that successfully transformed themselves*)
Case Sources Success factors
Jenaglas (precision
optical instruments,
East Germany)
Peng (2000), * Visionary Western management team, pushing through
Kogut and Zanderradical restructuring, even if opposed by local interest
(2000) groups.
* World-leading technological competence, yet without
brand (due to the loss of the Zeiss brand name to West
German Zeiss AG).
* Financial resources from government support.
Veba 
(textile, Czech
Republic)
Newman and * Leadership, esp. in terms of strategic thinking,
Nollen (1998), decisiveness and initiative, and cost awareness.
Matesova (1999) * Continuous learning from customer contact and
competition, and from Dutch consultants.
Revda 
(lighting, Russia)
Gallagher (1999),* Entrepreneurial leadership: innovative, decision maker,
Gallagher and visionary, creative.
Scott (199x) * “Changing the cultural norms of non-acceptance of
responsibility, the desire for certainty and the reticence to
cope with increased levels of ambiguity.” 
Szczecin Shipyard
(shipyard,          Loveman (1996), comprehensive restructuring plan.
Poland) Johnson et al. * Consensus of key stakeholders, especially workers and
Johnson and * Leadership: the chosen new manager came with a
(1996). creditors, was gained by making a persuasive case that a
smaller viable shipyard was preferable to a bankrupt
shipyard; hard budget constraints.
Drumet S.A. (Steal
wire, Poland)
Urbanek (1999) * The change of management in 1990 was of crucial
importance. 
* Some export experience, and sufficient resources to
finance investments internally.
CHEM_H
(chemical (2000). team pursuing socially responsible restructuring.
engineering, * Resources: cheap inputs based on long-term supply
Hungary) contracts, strong technology, and development of related
Lieb-Doczy * The end of political interference and new management
firms in the vicinity.
Graboplast
(textile, Hungary) Bodily (1996). turn around is the attitude of the CEO ... the manager’s
Grayson and * “The most important element which made this company
support to bring in outside consultants to cut the fat
around the company.
* cost leadership and high efficiency.
*) We include only firms that are not foreign-investment firms, and not newly established firms, and we
rely on the original authors’ assessment of the importance of the success factors.
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